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The European Union, Conflict Transformation and Civil Society:  





MICROCON Policy Working Paper 1 
Abstract: The European Union considers conflict resolution as a cardinal objective of 
its foreign policy. It makes use of a number of policy instruments to promote conflict 
transformation through ‘constructive engagement’, which cover a range of sectors 
affecting conditions and incentives at the micro level. The EU has recognised the 
importance of engaging with civil society in situations of violent conflict, but needs to 
engage more with local civil society to make its policies more effective. This paper 
provides a conceptual framework and discussion to analyse which local civil society 
actors play a role in conflict and conflict transformation, through which activities they 
impact on conflicts and how, what determines their effectiveness, and finally how EU 
neighbourhood policies can enhance their constructive impact in peacefully 
transforming conflicts in its near abroad by engaging with civil society. 
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conflict, conflict transformation 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The European Union, historically conceived as a peace project, has considered 
conflict resolution as a cardinal objective of its fledging foreign policy. The Lisbon 
Treaty explicitly states that the EU aims to promote peace (Title I, Article 3-1) and 
that its role in the world would reflect the principles that have inspired its creation, 
development and enlargement (Title V, Article 21). The Treaty identifies the 
contribution to peace, the prevention of conflict and the strengthening of international 
security amongst its core foreign policy priorities (Title V, Article 2c). More 
interestingly, the EU’s conception of peace has been broad, long-term and organic, 
including the principles of democracy, human rights, rule of law, international law, 
good governance and economic development (Commission 2001). The promotion of 
structural and sustainable peace has been prioritized above all in the EU 
neighbourhood. This was made clear in the 2003 Security Strategy, which argues that 
the Union’s task is to ‘make a particular contribution to stability and good governance 
in our immediate neighbourhood (and) to promote a ring of well governed countries to 
the East of the EU and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy 
cooperative relations’ (European Council 2003). It was reiterated in the Lisbon Treaty 
which posits that the Union ‘shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring 
countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded 
on the values of the Union’ (Title I, Article 8). Most poignantly, the documents 
establishing the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) voice the Union’s aspiration 
to contribute to the solution of regional conflicts (Commission 2004, p. 6).  
 
These public pronouncements clearly suggest that the EU is intent in promoting 
conflict transformation and resolution, over and above conflict management and  
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settlement in the neighbourhood. In other words, the EU is not simply interested in 
pursuing the management of conflicts through negotiation and compromise, 
incentivized by external powers deploying conditional sticks and carrots. It rejects the 
idea that violent conflict is endemic to human nature and espouses the view that 
conflict resolution is possible through the search for mutually beneficial solutions that 
allow for the satisfaction of all parties’ basic human needs (Burton 1990). Further 
still, the EU views as critical “indicators” of conflict prevention and resolution issues 
such as human and minority rights, democracy, state legitimacy, dispute resolving 
mechanisms, rule of law, social solidarity, sustainable development and a flourishing 
civil society (Kronenberger and Wouters 2005). This suggests that the Union aims at 
transforming the structural features of violent conflict, eradicating what Galtung 
(1969, 1994) defines as the seeds of structural violence: social injustice, unequal 
development and discrimination. While theoretically distinct, the EU’s approach also 
fits what Richmond (2006) conceptually and more broadly defines as third-generation 
“peace-building approaches”, which cover the wider economic, political and social 
make-up of countries both before, during and after the end of violent conflict.  
 
Beyond foreign policy objectives, the EU is also endowed with policy instruments to 
pursue conflict resolution and transformation in the neighbourhood. Beyond the 
narrow sphere of European Security and Defence Policy and the peace-keeping and 
peace-building missions that it foresees, the Union promotes conflict transformation 
principally through its “constructive engagement” with conflict parties (Commission 
2001, p. 8-9). By constructive engagement EU actors mean the deployment of a rich 
variety of measures of cooperation, which are normally specified in contractual 
agreements with third countries. These contractual relations take different forms, 
foreseeing different degrees of integration into and cooperation with the EU. They  
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range from the accession process aimed at the full membership of a candidate country, 
to looser forms of association, which envisage measures of economic, political and 
social cooperation with EU structures. As in the case of the accession process, these 
looser forms of association are also “contractual” in nature. Rather than a Treaty of 
Accession they foresee Association Agreements for the southern Mediterranean 
countries, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements for the former Soviet countries, 
Stabilization and Association Agreements for the Western Balkan countries and the 
future Neighbourhood Agreements (or Enhanced Agreements) for the southern and 
eastern neighbours. Beyond the goal of achieving varying degrees of cooperation with 
the EU, these contractual ties aim at fostering long-run structural change, such as 
conflict transformation, within and between third countries.   
 
Within the tradition of conflict transformation, the role of civil society is of the 
essence (Lederach 1997, Rupesinghe 1995). Civil society organizations (CSOs) on the 
one hand are pivotal in providing the necessary support for peace, ensuring that any 
agreement negotiated by political leaders is ultimately accepted and implemented on 
the ground (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999). On the other hand, civil 
society can provide the necessary push for peaceful social change, especially when the 
top echelons within a conflict context are unwilling or unable to budge on the 
fundamental conflict issues. This is not to say that civil society is always and 
necessarily a force for good. In so far as civil society is a reflection of society at large, 
in contexts of violent conflict and divided societies “uncivil society” inevitably exists 
and at times thrives. It can contribute to the polarization within and between 
communities, the reinforcement of horizontal inequalities and the legitimization or 
actual use of violence in the name of nationalism, exclusionary ideologies and at 
times even democracy, human rights and self-determination (Barnes 2005). In other  
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words, civil society is both an agent for change and a reflection of the conflict 
structure. By operating within a structure of conflict, often marked by state failure, 
authoritarianism, poverty and insecurity, civil society can be an actor in conflict 
escalation, inciting nationalism, ethnocentrism and violence (Paffenholz and Spurk 
2006).  Yet even in these cases, civil society remains a force to be reckoned with if the 
EU is intent in transforming conflicts in its troubled neighbourhood.  
 
The EU has already acknowledged the importance of engaging with civil society in 
order to enhance the effectiveness of its foreign policy in general and conflict 
resolution policy in particular. To this end, since the late 1990s, the European 
Parliament and Commission have established regular contact with civil society actors 
through the Human Rights Contact Group, the Civil Society Contact Group, the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy Contact Group and the Arms Transfer Contact 
Group. Furthermore the European Peacebuilding Liason Office (EPLO), a sub-group 
of the European Platform of NGOs, established in 2002 an office in Brussels in order 
to improve civil society access to EU institutions and policy-making in the field of 
conflict resolution. The EU’s principal focus has been on European CSOs. The 
Contact groups with the European Parliament include less than a dozen large 
European CSOs working in the fields of culture, environment, education, 
development, human rights, public heath, social issues and women. The EPLO 
includes 23 national or transnational European CSOs and networks.
2  
 
Yet a critical value added in the search for more effective EU policies lies in greater 
engagement with local civil society in conflict contexts in the neighbourhood. These 
CSOs may often look rather different from European organizations working on 
                                                 
2 http://www.eplo.org/index.php?id=45  
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conflict, and may well be non-voluntary in nature, less organized, less professional 
and with fewer human and financial resources than their EU counterparts. Yet 
whether formally organized or informal associations or non-voluntary groupings, 
local civil society typically has a greater understanding, legitimacy and stake in both 
conflict and conflict transformation (Bell and Carens 2004). Rather than acting as an 
external bystander, it is a first hand actor in conflict, and as such represents a 
necessary, albeit not sufficient, actor in promoting peace. As part of society, local 
civil society can recognize and understand the underlying root causes of greed and 
grievance underpinning conflict (Murshed 2008), the failure of the social contract to 
peacefully regulate social needs and desires, and consequently the polarization and 
tension between communities (see Microcon 2008). At the same time, local CSOs can 
act as the seed of group formation, mobilization, communication and empowerment, 
which are necessary to induce peaceful social change (Varshney 2001), but which 
may also create the necessary “opportunity” for conflict escalation (Microcon 2008). 
The EU itself is beginning to recognize the need to engage more with local civil 
society actors (Commission 2006b). As put by the former UN Secretary General 
(2004): ‘[i]f peacebuilding missions are to be effective, they should, as part of a clear 
political strategy, work with and strengthen those civil society forces that are helping 
ordinary people to voice their concerns, and to act on them in peaceful ways … 
Engagement with civil society is not an end in itself, nor is it a panacea. But it is vital 
to our efforts to turn the promise of peace agreements into the reality of peaceful 
societies and viable states’. In other words, engaging with local civil society is of the 
essence to enhance the legitimacy, rootedness and thus long-term effectiveness of EU 
conflict transformation policies in its neighbourhood.   
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With this premise in mind, the aim of this paper is to provide a conceptual framework 
and discussion to analyse which local civil society actors play a role in conflict and 
conflict transformation, through which activities they impact on conflicts and how, 
what determines their effectiveness, and finally how can EU neighbourhood policies 
enhance their constructive impact in peacefully transforming conflicts in its near 
abroad by engaging with civil society.      
 
2.  Civil Society in Conflict and Conflict Transformation 
 
Civil society can be broadly defined as the area of voluntary collective action, driven 
by shared values and/or interests which operates beyond the state, the market and the 
family, and which provides the web of social relations linking these three spheres 
(Barnes 2005, Paffenholz and Spurk 2006, Fischer 2006). In view of its tight 
interconnection with the conflict structure, local civil society at times promotes the 
civic values and practices necessary for a peaceful transformation of conflict, while at 
other times directly contributes to the causes and symptoms of conflict. As such civil 
society is not understood here as a normative concept but rather as an analytical 
category of actors to be investigated in order to ascertain what their precise impact on 
conflict is.  
 
  A typology of actors 
 
Who constitutes local civil society in conflict contexts? In view of the broad and 
analytical definition given of civil society, we include a wide variety of actors in our 
study. Table 1 adapts the categorization provided by Diamond and McDonald’s 
(1996) multi-track diplomacy model to distinguish between eight different types of  
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actors, which can be engaged directly or indirectly in conflict and conflict 
transformation: conflict professionals, economic actors, private citizens, training and 
education bodies, activists, religion-based actors, funding bodies, and communication 
actors. Although there is inevitably some overlap in the membership and roles of 
these different categories, these eight groupings are sufficiently delineated to allow 
for a precise identification of the different CSOs involved in conflict (Marchetti and 





Table 1: CSO categories 
 
   




1.     
Professionals engaged in conflict/resolution 
 
 
Technical experts and consultants, 
Research centres and think tanks, 
Professional NGOs 






Cooperatives and self-help initiatives 
Organized crime networks 
3.     
Private Citizens 
 
Individual citizens,  
Diaspora groups,  
Family and clan based associations 
4.     
 Training and Education 
 
Training NGOs 
Schools and universities 





























  Local civil society potential for conflict escalation and transformation 
  
Precisely how and why does local civil society contribute to conflict escalation as well 
as transformation? As noted above, civil society, while being distinct from the state, 
the family and the market, acts as the social glue between the three, thus undertaking 
an essentially political function in society. In other words, civil society is distinct 
from, while interacting with, politics and policy across all its domains (Chazan 1992, 
p.281). As analysed by Lederarch (1997) and reproduced in Figure 1, civil society is 
active at both mid- and grassroots-levels of society. At mid-level there are elite civil 
society actors ranging from universities and research centres, professional NGOs, 
unions and professional associations, local media groups, artists, as well as overtly 
“uncivil society” groups such as organized crime networks. At grassroots level we 
find CSOs and networks such as community, women, student and faith-based groups, 
social movements and activists, combatant groups and supporting institutions, 
cooperatives, self-help organizations and charities.  
 
Most important, civil society links the three stylized levels of society in Lederarch’s 
pyramid. On the one hand, mid-level CSOs are closely tied to top-level policy-making 
through their interactions with parliaments, executives, big business, foundations and 
major media holdings. Through their advocacy, policy research, and negotiation 
support activities, mid-level CSOs can both ease conflict settlement and press top 
echelons to modify the structural features of governance that gave rise to conflict in 
the first place. These mid-level actors build personal and professional relations with 
the top echelons and provide a pivotal function because of their unofficial nature. 
Compared to the top level, mid-level CSOs in fact normally enjoy more political 
independence, and thus more creativity and flexibility, as well as greater ability to  
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operate beyond the limelight of the media. This allows these actors to act as critical 
norm entrepreneurs in conflict transformation (Wallace and Josselin 2001). They also 
have better access to and dialogue with diverse sectors of society, being able to talk to 
different parties without losing credibility; and a greater inclination to work on long-
term and structural issues rather than on the short-term ones determined by the current 
political agenda. Indeed as noted by Richmond (2005), many NGOs emerged in the 
1990s precisely as a response to the peacebuilding requirements of states and 
international organizations. 
 
On the other hand, mid-level actors are organically linked to grassroots CSOs, which 
are principal agents in the cultivation of “peace constituencies” in society writ large 
(Lederarch 1997). They do so by mobilizing the public to tackle and react to the 
underlying conditions of structural or open violence through education, training, 
capacity-building and awareness raising. Indeed many social movements are 
constituted by networks of like-minded NGOs operating at grassroots and mid-levels. 
Mid and grassroots CSOs also induce conflict transformation by fostering societal 
reconciliation, through inter-communal dialogue, peace commissions and by fostering 
functional cooperation and communication across communities. Finally, local CSOs 
can reach out to the wider public through service delivery, be this of a material (e.g., 
relief and rehabilitation) or psychological nature (post-war trauma therapy). Local 
civil society interactions with the public are of the essence to ensure that the voice of 
the people is not swamped in the evolution of both conflict and peace.  
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Source: Lederarch (1997) 
 
Yet precisely because of the linkages it provides across different levels of society, 
local civil society can also act as a factor in conflict escalation. As noted above, local 
civil society is an agent in conflict as well as a product of the conflict structure. As a 
microcosm of society, it inevitably displays the underlying causes and symptoms of 
conflict. In situations of violent conflict, local civil society actors can provide the 
rationale and moral justification for violence, partake and support violent actions, or 
contribute through discourse to the overall securitization of the conflict. In conflicts 
marked by ethnic or religious strife, civil society can promote ideologies based on 
racism, nationalism and intolerance, thus exacerbating communal divisions, enemy 
images and exclusive identities. In conflicts marked by socio-economic inequalities 
and political discrimination, civil society can reinforce the conditions of structural 
   
Grassroots 
Family and community-based groups, student and youth groups, social 
movements, cooperatives and self-help groups, women groups, activists, faith 
based groups, charities, social welfare organizations, combatant groups 
Mid-range 
Local government, local media, public policy 
and training NGOs, research centres and 
think tanks, professional associations, unions, 
organized crime networks, universities, art 
 
Top-level 






violence and power asymmetry, divert resources away from productive activities, and 
dis-empower underprivileged communities.   
 
3.  Civil Society Activities  
 
Beyond their role and linkage function in society, through which activities can local 
civil society contribute to conflict escalation and transformation? Do these actions 
impact directly or indirectly on the conflict? How can these activities be categorized? 
And do some civil society actions prevail at different stages of conflict and conflict 
transformation?  
 
  Direct and indirect civil society actions in conflict 
 
The activities of local CSOs can be directly or indirectly linked to the conflict 
situation. Direct activities are those whose objective is to contribute explicitly to the 
conflict and its transformation. These actions can be directly aimed at conflict 
escalation. Combatant groups can mobilize for violent rebellion, research centres or 
religious leaders can provide the intellectual or moral justification for violence, 
discrimination or repression; universities and the media can foster enemy images and 
a securitized understanding of the conflict; and professional associations and unions 
can support and exacerbate ethnic or religious discrimination. On the opposite end of 
the spectrum local CSOs can be involved in peaceful conflict transformation. Social 
movements, student and women groups can mobilize for non-violent social change; 
NGOs can foster inter-communal dialogue, provide support to official negotiations, 
and engage in truth and reconciliation activities; universities, research centres and 
activists can monitor and denounce public policies and practices on the ground;  
  13
training NGOs, artists and youth groups can engage in peace education and the 
rearticulation of identities, interests and values within conflict societies. Last, local 
civil society can have a direct role in conflict transformation by operating on the 
symptoms of conflict. Hence charities, community-based groups and social welfare 
organizations can provide relief to affected populations; and professional NGOs can 
be engaged in trauma therapy, de-mining and reconstruction efforts.  
 
Local CSOs can also be indirectly involved in conflict and conflict transformation by 
working on issues which are tied to the conflict. Hence, local CSOs can engage in 
activities pertaining to issues such as democracy, human rights, governance, security 
sector reform, justice, gender, education or development, i.e., all issues which are 
inextricably tied to the eruption, evolution and transformation of conflict. On the 
negative side, organized crime networks can indirectly sustain conflict by thriving on 
war economies and thus pressing for the continuation of conflict.  
 
  Methods of actions across stages of conflict  
 
Local civil society activities can be divided broadly according to their general method 
and approach: they can be adversarial or non-adversarial; they can deal with the 
causes or with the symptoms of conflict. As in the case of CSO actors, this 
categorization of activities is not exclusive and there are significant areas of overlap. 
However defining activities according to these four broad methods of action can help 
organize and better understand a broad range of activities.  
 
Adversarial actions can be roughly divided between largely grassroots actions aimed 
at public mobilization, and mid-level actions aimed at top-level advocacy, monitoring  
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and shaming. In both cases adversarial methods aim at transforming conflict by 
altering power relations and cost-benefit calculations within a conflict context. They 
aim at increasing the political, social, legal or economic costs for conflict parties 
persisting in a particular position or action. Hence on the one hand, social movements, 
activists, trade unions, and women, student and youth groups can raise public 
awareness of conflict issues and mobilize the people into adversarial collective action 
through demonstrations, strikes, campaigns and petitions. Artists and journalists can 
powerfully expose and sensitize the public to the causes and symptoms of conflict, as 
well as the underlying conditions of structural violence. On the other hand, 
particularly mid-level CSOs can engage in advocacy and denunciation vis-à-vis top-
level echelons as well as the international community, basing their activities on fact-
finding, early-warning and monitoring. Mid-level professional NGOs and bar 
associations can also engage in litigation with public authorities, in order to expose 
and seek rectification to injustices through legal action.    
 
By contrast, non-adversarial activities can also be divided between dialogue and 
research activities, and are normally carried out by mid-level actors. Both types of 
activities are non-adversarial in the sense that they rely on non-coercive methods or 
persuasion and learning in order to induce social change in conflict. Dialogue 
activities can take different forms (Rothman 1998). Tracks 2 and 3 diplomacy 
activities are aimed at supporting official negotiations and working through 
differences between conflict parties. They include inter-communal dialogue projects 
between people sharing similar professional roles and experiences (e.g., unionists, 
students, women, religious leaders) in order to foster cross-communal trust and 
understanding, and subsequent changes in the perceptions of the “other”. They can 
include exclusively moderates across conflict divides in order to elaborate joint peace  
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proposals in a problem-solving fashion and act as pre-negotiation forums. 
Alternatively, they can engage extremists as well in order to allow all parties to voice 
their concerns, establish human contact and hedge against potential spoiling activities 
without necessarily seeking consensus between participants (Ropers 2003). Beyond 
dialogue, non-adversarial activities also include policy research and advocacy, aimed 
at identifying gaps in the analysis of conflict or proposing solutions for resolution to 
the top-echelons in order to sustain and complement official peace processes. 
 
Local civil society can also deal with the underlying causes of conflict, by engaging in 
training, capacity-building and education activities. Through training courses or 
summer camps CSOs can help affected individuals in conflict to reckon with the past, 
reduce prejudices and stereotypes of the “other” and develop inclusionary and 
multiple identities. Training and education activities can also target “multiplier” 
agents such as journalists, professionals, NGO activists, teachers, youth workers, 
religious leaders, party activists or film-makers, which in turn have access to and can 
influence broader constituencies (Schmelzle 2006).  
 
Conversely, civil society can operate on the material or psychological symptoms of 
conflict, by engaging in operational service delivery targeted to the needs of conflict 
societies. During periods of active violence, these activities can include inter-
positioning, civilian peacekeeping and the protection of endangered individuals. In 
post-violence phases they include demobilization and disarmament of combatant 
groups, refugee repatriation and reintegration, de-mining, relief, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction. They can also be engaged in community building and integration, and 
individual or group trauma therapy. 
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Indeed different civil society activities and methods are best suited to different stages 
in the evolution and transformation of conflict (Anderson and Olson 2003). In stages 
of latent structural violence, where the principal aim is that of conflict prevention, 
actions aimed at early-warning, non-violent mobilization and awareness-raising are of 
the essence. During stages of active violence, activities such as relief, inter-
positioning or civilian peacekeeping may be necessary. During post-ceasefire stages 
civil society actors engaged in multi-track diplomacy, dialogue, policy research and 
advocacy may play a critical role in pushing for peace agreements. Finally in stages of 
post-violence and post-agreement, operational CSOs may engage in reconstruction, 
de-mining, refugee repatriation, education and training, and truth and reconciliation 
activities. As discussed by Bell and Keenan (2004), in situations of conflict transition, 
some civil society actors focussing on particular functions may no longer be needed 
while others may have to revise their philosophies, mandates and modus operandi.  
  
  17







Adversarial Grassroots  awareness/mobilization: 
-  Demonstrations 
-  Strikes 
-  Campaigns 
-  Petitions 
-  Art work 
-  Journalism 
Top-level pressure: 
-  Fact-finding and monitoring 
-  Advocacy 
-  Litigation 
Non-adversarial Dialogue: 
-  Track 2 and 3 negotiations 
-  Inter-communal dialogue 
Policy research and advocacy 
-  Conflict analysis 
-  Proposing solutions 
Operating on the causes of conflict  -  Training courses 
-  Summer camps 
-  Capacity-building 
-  Education 
Operating on the symptoms of conflict  -  Inter-positioning 
-  Civilian peacekeeping 
-  Protection of endangered individuals 
-  Demobilization and disarmament 
-  Refugee repatriation and reintegration 
-  De-mining 
-  Relief 
-  Rehabilitation 
-  Reconstruction 
-  Community building and reintegration 
-  Trauma therapy 
 
 
4.  The impact and effectiveness of local civil society in conflict 
 
Civil society can have positive as well as negative impacts on conflict. Their activities 
can potentially represent prime forces in the escalation of violent conflict, while also 
driving the peaceful transformation of conflict. But exactly how can we categorize the 
possible impacts of local civil society actors in conflict? And what determines the 
effectiveness of these impacts? 
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  Impact 
 
As discussed by Marchetti and Tocci (2007), civil society can have fuelling, holding 
and peacemaking impacts. Local civil society fuels conflict when its activities 
exacerbate the greed and grievance causes of conflict, thus worsening the 
incompatibility of subject positions between conflict parties (Diez and Pia 2007). This 
can be done by discursively polarizing positions between the parties, legitimizing the 
persistence or aggravation of violence, discrimination or injustice, or inciting 
exclusive ideologies, nationalism, racism and xenophobia. Local civil society can also 
contribute to the material aggravation of the causes of conflict, by directly 
participating in violence or adding to the political, social or economic root causes of 
violent conflict.  
 
On the other end of the spectrum, local civil society can contribute to the settlement, 
resolution and transformation of violent conflict. It can materially act to rectify the 
underlying structural causes of conflict, or it can discursively contribute to 
transforming subject positions within a conflict context, for example by including 
members from different communities, and thus allowing conflict parties to establish 
contact, build bridges and manage tensions between them (Varshney 2001).  
 
Finally, local civil society can have a holding impact on conflict. Holding activities 
affect the material and psychological symptoms of conflict rather than its underlying 
causes. Hence, they neither augment nor diffuse the underlying roots of conflict, but 
rather influence the manner in which the resulting incompatibility of subject positions 
between conflict parties manifests itself. Operating on the symptoms of conflict does 
not entail that in the long-run holding activities may not have a positive or negative  
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impact on conflict transformation. On some occasions, operating on the symptoms of 
conflict, even if in a short-term positive manner such as providing relief, may sustain 
and prolong conflict dynamics by alleviating its most acute manifestations, 
legitimizing corrupt regimes or creating war economies. Holding actions such as 
operations aimed at securing a ceasefire may also provide the breathing space for a 
renewed round of fighting, or induce growing levels of domestic violence and 
violence against women, typical of low intensity violence periods in conflicts (Copper 
2007). On other occasions, short-term holding actions may instead lead to long-term 
conflict transformation by providing a non-confrontational terrain in which 
communities can cooperate. Inter-communal initiatives for de-mining for example, 
while representing a holding operation, can indirectly build communication, trust and 
understanding between communities thus having a conflict transformation potential 
over time. Alternatively, holding activities operating on the most acute symptoms of 
conflict (e.g. violence, poverty, health, destruction) may help easing the conflict 
environment, thus creating a more fertile ground for an ensuing tackling of its root 
causes. In the long-term, holding actions therefore do not have a neutral effect on 
conflict. Holding can either prepare the ground for peace or set the conditions for a 
relapse into escalation.  
 
Naturally establishing the precise impact of a civil society is no simple feat. As 
discussed by Anderson and Olson (2003) problems of impact assessment are of three 
different kinds. First, the causal relation between a particular CSO activity and an 
ensuing impact on the conflict may be extremely difficult to disentangle. Second, civil 
society impact is often unmeasurable, in so far as it relates to a gradual and highly 
complex shift in beliefs, visions, interests, identities and relationships. Third, while 
we may be able to determine the precise impact of one activity, the relationship of this  
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micro impact to the macro developments within a conflict are subjective and difficult 
to ascertain. In other words, impact analysis is often qualitative in nature and in part 
subjective. Yet it can nonetheless prove to be a highly fruitful exercise to be carefully 
conducted through interviews with CSOs, the recipients of their activities as well as 
through cross-checking interviews with other official and civil society actors 
acquainted with the specific activity under investigation.   
  Effectiveness 
 
Beyond impact, a last key variable in the analysis of local civil society in conflict is its 
effectiveness, regardless of whether the activities in question are peacebuilding, 
holding or fuelling. We have identified five principal factors which determine the 
effectiveness of a particular local CSO activity in conflict: the rootedness and 
efficiency of the CSO itself; its relations with other CSOs; its relations with the top-
level and in particular the state and the mainstream media; and its relations with the 
international community involved in conflict. A fifth and final factor is time 
contingent shocks and events, specific to each and every conflict context.  
 
A first determinant of effectiveness is the nature of the CSO and in particular its 
rootedness and legitimacy in society on the one hand, and its organizational, financial 
and professional quality on the other. Excelling in both respects is rare. Often 
grassroots CSOs such as social movements or community-based organizations may be 
extremely rooted in society and enjoy in-depth local knowledge, yet they may lack 
effective organization and professionalism as well as a viable financial base. By 
contrast, mid-level CSOs such as research centres and NGOs, may be highly 
professional and efficient, but their elite nature may entail a lack or loss of touch with 
the needs and desires of the wider public. Other CSOs may instead be deficient in  
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both respects, being disconnected to society while also being overbureaucratized, 
oligarchical and inefficient.   
 
A second factor shaping the effectiveness of a particular CSO is its 
interconnectedness within the wider civil society sphere in the conflict. This relates to 
the overall level and quality of social capital within a conflict country. To the extent 
that CSOs are aware of each other, work together and are able to strategize about the 
most effective division of labour between them in the pursuit of shared objectives, the 
effectiveness of their actions is enhanced. The greater the interconnectedness of the 
civil society sphere within a conflict context, and the higher is the potential for a 
transfer of know-how, increased professionalism and thus effectiveness of local 
CSOs. If instead the civil society scene is weak and fragmented, activities are 
duplicated while others not undertaken, and strategizing is embryonic or absent, the 
fuelling, holding or peacebuilding impact of CSOs is curtailed. Within a conflict, 
inter-CSO relations can take place both within and between communities and both can 
be important to enhance peacebuilding. Varshney (2001) analysed how inter-
communal CSO activity can build bridges across conflict divides. However, when 
horizontal inequalities are high, building social capital within the more disadvantaged 
community can help reduce inter-communal inequalities and foster reconciliation 
(Stewart 2008). Indeed inter-communal civil society relations may contribute to 
peacebuilding only if inter-communal relations are not marked by high levels of 
horizontal inequality (Hewstone and Brown 1986).    
 
A third determinant of effectiveness is the relationship between the CSO and state 
institutions and the mainstream media. Here the most evident point to make is that 
CSOs which are close to or accepted by the state tend to be the ones espousing  
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“establishment” views, and as such face no hindrance from or are politically 
supported by the state. These organizations also tend to benefit from the coverage of 
the mainstream media, which enhances the public resonance of their activities. 
Because of state support and media coverage, their actions may initially appear as 
being “more effective”. However upon closer inspection this effectiveness is merely a 
result of their role in reproducing the dominant discourse of the state. Conversely, 
organizations which are widely perceived as espousing stark “anti-establishment” 
views may initially appear as being largely ineffective in so far as they are often 
repressed or ostracized by official institutions, and their activities are either ignored or 
portrayed in a highly negative light by the mainstream media. However, precisely 
because of this, the effectiveness of these CSOs is greater than first meets the eye. 
These CSOs and their non-relations with the state and media may well have a similar 
impact to that of establishment CSOs. On other occasions instead, local civil society 
may receive little support yet little hindrance from the state, and enjoy little or no 
coverage by the mainstream media. This often tends to reduce their impact on 
conflict, given their low visibility. However on some occasions and particularly in the 
case of dialogue activities, operating beyond the limelight of the state, media and 
wider public may raise the effectiveness and chances of success of these activities.  
 
A fourth determinant of effectiveness are relations with the international community. 
Relations with external actors involved in a conflict influence CSO effectiveness in 
three respects. First, working with the international level may raise the impact of a 
civil society action by winning over the support of external supporters. Support, as we 
shall see below, can take several forms, including both financial and political. Second, 
relations with external actors can raise the status and visibility of local civil society, 
thus increasing its effectiveness. When local civil society establishes ties with the  
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international level its role in the domestic conflict context may be taken more 
seriously. Hence, if international organizations rely on the local knowledge and 
analysis produced by CSOs involved in monitoring and fact-finding, the status, 
reputation and thus effectiveness of the latter vis-à-vis the domestic official level may 
improve. Lastly, relations with the international community can influence the 
effectiveness of civil society activity by affecting the roles of external players 
themselves. Especially in highly internationalized conflicts such as those in the 
Middle East or the Caucasus, influencing the roles of the United States or Russia is as 
important as affecting the roles of the conflict parties themselves.  
 
Finally, the effectiveness of local CSOs depends on country-specific and time-
contingent factors. The scope for effective CSO action depends on the extent to which 
the laws, institutions and political culture of a specific conflict country allow for and 
accept a “political” role of local civil society in conflict. Dominant political ideologies 
within a country also determine which CSOs may prove more influential and 
effective. In situations rampant nationalism for example, one could expect 
nationalistic CSOs to have greater resonance, support and influence than technical 
NGOs promoting multicultural or civic values. Specific events or trends in a country 
also have in some instances favoured the growth, development and effectiveness of 
civil society while on other occasions curtailed the scope foe CSO activity.  
 
5.  The Role of the EU in the Neighbourhood 
 
Particularly if the EU is intent in promoting conflict transformation, over and above 
conflict management and settlement, then it cannot afford to neglect the civil society 
dimension in conflict. As noted at the outset, the EU is prone to viewing and  
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intervening in conflicts in a bottom-up and structural manner, and many of its policy 
instruments can influence the conditions and incentives playing out at the mid or 
micro levels of conflict. This is true particularly of the EU’s interactions with 
neighbouring countries. In particular the ENP, building upon existing contractual ties 
with neighbouring countries (e.g., the Association Agreements with the southern 
Mediterranean countries and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the 
former Soviet countries) promises to enhance the depth and breadth of EU 
involvement in neighbourhood conflicts. Not only does the ENP consider conflict 
resolution as one of its key priorities. In its Communication (2006), the Commission 
argues that these conflicts ‘are not only our neighbours’ problems. They risk 
producing major spillovers for the EU, such as illegal immigration, unreliable energy 
supplies, environmental degradation and terrorism’. In its Communication (2007), the 
Commission adds that the Union has ‘a direct interest in working with partners to 
promote their resolution, because they undermine EU efforts to promote political 
reform and economic development in the neighbourhood and because they could 
affect the EU’s own security’. Furthermore, the manner in which the ENP is 
structured, making use of detailed Action Plans foreseeing long lists of priorities of 
action spanning across all policy areas, raises the scope for the EU’s bottom-up and 
long-term involvement in conflict transformation. As put by the Commission (2007), 
‘[T]he deployment of all available tools, whether first, second or third pillar, would 
increase EU influence and avoid the limitations of short-term crisis management’.  
 
More specifically, the ENP views civil society as a key actor in the neighbourhood, 
being part of the democratic governance of the EU and of its neighbours, providing 
valuable monitoring and policy implementation functions, and contributing advice to 
EU institutions and neighbourhood states alike. The Commission, in the context of the  
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ENP has indeed established platforms for dialogue with CSOs from neighbouring 
countries, conducted within each partner country, primarily in view of the bilateral 
rather than multilateral focus of the ENP (Commission 2006b). In particular the EU 
has targeted and sought ties with CSOs working on issues such as democratization, 
human rights, , freedom of expression, women rights, education, environment and 
research in neighbouring countries.    
 
The ENP can affect the civil society dimension of conflict in two ways. It can affect 
the  structural  features of conflict, thus impacting upon the political opportunity 
structure in which local civil society operates. In this way it can shape the 
effectiveness of civil society action, and in particular two of its critical determinants: 
intra-civil society relations, and relations between CSOs and the state. The 
implementation of the Action Plans agreed bilaterally with individual neighbourhood 
countries, by shaping the policies and institutional features of conflict countries, could 
influence the overall environment in which civil society operates, facilitating or 
hindering both CSO interactions, and the relationship and access of CSOs to the state. 
By covering a wide range of sectors such as institutions, infrastructure, health, 
education, trade and investment, the implementation of the Action Plans could thus 
play a role in shaping the overall environment in which CSOs operate, increasing or 
reducing the effectiveness of their actions in conflict.  
 
The ENP can also affect the civil society dimension of neighbourhood conflicts by 
influencing CSOs as agents in conflict and conflict transformation. Particularly since 
2006, the EU has recognized the need to strengthen the civil society dimension of the 
ENP. It proposes to enhance the quality and status of CSOs in the neighbourhood 
through exchanges between CSOs in the EU and the neighbourhood in the economic,  
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social and cultural realms, and by making use of the resources available under the 
European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI). The Commission (2006a 
and 2006b) has also openly suggested to enhance civil society participation in the 
ENP by encouraging neighbourhood governments to seek civil society involvement in 
governance. To this end, the Commission also organized an ENP Conference in 
September 2007, bringing together governmental and civil society actors from the EU 
and neighbourhood countries for the first time (Commission 2007, p. 11). In other 
words, the ENP aims at enhancing the quality and status of local civil society in the 
neighbourhood through training and exchanges, funding and by encouraging their 
political role within domestic environments. 
 
But despite this general will to enhance its role in conflict resolution in the 
neighbourhood and strengthen the civil society dimension of the ENP, two critical 
policy questions remain open. First, which CSOs does the EU engage with in the 
neighbourhood? As discussed above, civil society can fuel conflict as well as promote 
peace. Does the EU correctly identify fuelling actors and activities? If so, does it and 
should it engage, ignore or weaken these CSOs, and only interact with peacebuilding 
ones? What should its approach be towards holding activities? Should it only focus on 
peacebuilding CSOs or also engage with holding ones in order to ensure that their 
activities would in the long-term cultivate the terrain for peace? Second, does the ENP 
succeed in raising the effectiveness of CSO peacebuilding activities, or does it 
instead, inadvertently, weaken the impact of these activities? How could the ENP 
raise the effectiveness of civil society peacebuilding actions?  In order to answer these 
two fundamental policy questions we set out three hypotheses to guide ensuing 
empirical research into five conflicts in the neighbourhood. These three hypotheses  
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are by no means mutually exclusive, and we may well find that features of all three 
co-exist within the same conflict in the EU neighbourhood.  
    
  Hypothesis 1: The Liberal Peace Paradigm 
 
A first hypothesis to be tested is that the EU contributes to conflict transformation by: 
a.  strengthening the structure of local civil society by raising the 
interconnectedness between mid-level CSOs and top-level actors on the one 
hand, and mid-level and grassroots actors on the other, thus raising the 
effectiveness of civil society impact on conflict  
b.  enhancing the agency of peacebuilding CSOs, while weakening or 
constructively altering the views and actions of fuelling/holding CSOs. The 
EU would do so primarily by engaging directly with mid-level CSOs (through 
dialogue and funding) and by indirectly reaching out to grassroots CSOs.   
 In meeting this hypothesis, the EU fulfils two principal aims. A minimum threshold 
objective is that of “doing no harm” (Anderson 1999). The EU thus ensures that its 
policies, be these aimed at structure or agency, do not have negative distortionary 
effects, such as delegitimizing peacebuilding CSOs through excessive co-option; or 
inadvertedly strengthening fuelling CSOs by openly supporting, ignoring or actively 
attempting to weaken them. A maximum threshold objective is that of building local 
capacities for peace by empowering peacebuilding CSOs and weakening or altering 
the views of fuelling ones (Bigdon and Korf 2002). As illustrated by Figure 2, the EU 
would increase the interconnectedness of the three levels of society (point a. above), 
and on the other raise its effectiveness in conflict transformation by interacting with 
mid-level CSOs, which are in turn connected to grassroots CSOs and the wider public 
(point b. above).   
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  Hypothesis 2: The Leftist Critique 
 
Under a second hypothesis, EU engagement with local civil society is detrimental to  
 
5.2 Hypothesis 2: The Leftist Critique 
Under a second hypothesis, EU engagement with local civil society is detrimental to 
conflict transformation. This is not simply because the EU misidentifies local CSOs 
thus inadvertently strengthening fuelling CSOs and/or weakening peacebuilding ones. 
It is rather because the very fact of engaging with local civil society alters its nature 
and effectiveness in a manner detrimental to peace.  
 
This could take place in two interlinked ways. First, EU interaction and engagement 
with local CSOs could lead to a seeming “depoliticization” of local civil society 
(Fischer 1997), rendering mid-level CSOs technical instruments at the service of top-
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level echelons at domestic and international levels. This would lead to a mushrooming 
of holding CSO activities focussed on the symptoms of conflict, to the detriment of 
peacebuilding ones. For example it could take the form of EU engagement and 
support for liberal, technical, professional service-based and urban NGOs to the 
detriment of more overtly political CSOs such as trade unions, social movements, 
religious charities or community-based organizations operating in more local and 
rural contexts (Belloni 2001). EU (and other external) funding and support for civil 
society in conflict may in fact lead to an “explosion” of the NGO sector, also dubbed 
“non-grassroots organizations”, briefcase NGOs (BRINGOs), mafia NGOs 
(MANGOs), criminal NGOs (CRINGOs), government-owned NGOs (GONGOs), 
commercial NGOs (CONGOs) and my-own NGOs (MONGOs) (Reimann 2005, 
p.42). Driven by external funds, these organizations become veritable businesses, and 
may also enhance corruption in the civil society domain, inequalities and even 
creating new stakes in the continuation of conflict. Smaller or more political 
organizations would either be directly shunned by the EU or they would fail to meet 
the necessary technical/bureaucratic requirements to be allocated EU funds. As such, 
the potential for the constructive mobilization and politicization of society would 
reduce, diminishing the prospects for grassroots actors to alter the structural 
conditions of violent conflict.  
 
Second, EU and more generally external engagement with and support for civil 
society could excessively “politicize” and co-opt civil society, transforming local 
CSOs into spokesmen of external policies, priorities and proposed solutions, which 
may be alien to the needs and desires of the conflict parties themselves (see Ferguson 
1990 and Chandler 1998). As put by Richmond (2005, p. 26), CSOs would act ‘as 
thinly veiled fronts for powerful state interests in that they act as a front for the  
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insertion of realist state interests in a disguised form’. Civil society would thus 
become driven more by the top-down supply of external funds than a bottom-up 
demand of societal needs and desires. In an attempt to justify or legitimize EU 
policies in conflict contexts, civil society actors would delegitimize themselves, to the 
point of being viewed as “traitors” in the eyes of grassroots CSOs and the wider 
public. The mere fact of being funded by an external actor such as the EU could also 
create the perception in the public’s mind that a CSO acts on behalf of foreign rather 
than domestic interests.   
 
In other words, under this second hypothesis, EU policies in conflict contexts would 
not be strengthened by engagement with local civil society, aimed at improving the 
rootedness and the transformative potential of the EU. The reverse would instead take 
place, whereby the EU would fundamentally shape and alter the nature of local civil 
society into a dependent functional substitute within the liberal paradigm of EU 
foreign policy, detaching and delegitimizing it in the eyes of the public (see also 
Chandler 2001). In doing so a limited and distorted form of civil society would 
emerge while existing local capacity would be harmed or destroyed (Richmond and 
Carey 2005). Civil society would lose its autonomy and become accountable to EU 
donors rather than its own domestic constituencies. It would respond to the EU’s 
political priorities as well as the tendency to focus on short-term, outcome-driven and 
quantifiable projects, which may be far removed from the long-term, dynamic, 
process-driven and multidimensional needs of peacebuilding (Vukosavljevic 2007). 
As a result local civil society involved in peacebuilding would become ineffective at 
best or switch into holding or fuelling conflict at worst. As highlighted in Figure 3, 
the EU, by interacting with top- and mid- level actors would thus distort the nature of  
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civil society, contributing to a detachment of mid-level CSOs from grassroots ones 
and the wider public.     
 



















  Hypothesis 3: The Gramscian Critique 
A third and final hypothesis assumes that conflict is fundamentally driven by the top-
levels of society and in particular by state-based actors. In turn, the potential for civil 
society to influence conflict depends fundamentally on the space the top-level and the 
state in particular leaves open to civil society engagement. If this space is limited or 
non-existent (i.e., in situations of authoritarian and illiberal contexts often found in 
conflict situations), then EU engagement with civil society alone is unlikely to yield a 
visible impact on conflict. Unless the EU exerts effective pressure on state actors to 
engage in democratic reform, thus altering the structure in which civil society 
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operates, EU policy is unlikely to induce conflict transformation. Likewise if the EU 
engages with state actors by supporting or failing to persuade neighbourhood states to 
alter their structural political deficiencies, then its support, engagement and financing 
of civil society cannot improve the effectiveness of EU conflict transformation 
policies. This is highlighted in Figure 4, which shows a detachment of the top levels 
of society from mid and grassroots actors. In this context, EU policy would 
ineffectively influence conflicts by engaging with CSOs yet failing to pressurize the 
top-levels to engage in structural change.  
 




















6.  Guidelines for Empirical Research 
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The aim of this paper has been to provide a conceptual analysis and framework to 
understand the role and impact the EU may have on conflict and conflict 
transformation by interacting with local civil society in conflict contexts. Its purpose 
is to guide future empirical research into the EU’s role, through civil society, in five 
conflicts in the neighbourhood: Georgia and Abkhazia, Moldova and Transnistria, 
Nagorno Karabakh, Morocco and Western Sahara and Israel-Palestine. More 
specifically, to allow for subsequent comparative analysis, the project would benefit if 
the empirical case studies were conducted by following a similar framework and 
structure, aimed at testing the three broad hypotheses outlined above. This could take 
the form of: 
  
 
1.  The EU and Civil Society: Based on secondary literature and an analysis of 
EU documents and declarations, provide a general analysis of EU involvement 
in the civil society domain of the conflict country/ies under investigation. In 
particular, outline which appear to be the general priorities and objectives of 
EU engagement with civil society, and which civil society actors and activities 
the EU appears to favour most and why, bearing in mind that 
development/democracy/peace processes may go along in tandem. Is the EU 
simply attempting to win legitimacy for its foreign policies through the 
engagement/co-option of civil society? Does it prioritize conflict resolution by 
bringing opposing sides together in dialogue? Does it principally focus on 
development objectives by focusing on service-delivery CSOs etc? 
2.  CSO Typologies: Based on the typology of actors provided in Table 1, select, 
study and interview one organizations at mid or grassroots levels, for each side 
of the conflict, and/bi-communal groups if/where relevant for each of the 8  
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types of actors (e.g., 1 CSO x 2 conflict parties x 8  types of CSO actors = 16 
CSOs studied in each conflict). 
3.  CSO Activities: Analyse the activities of these organizations and whether 
their actions have direct/indirect bearing on the conflict; whether they are 
adversarial/non-adversarial; and whether they operate on the causes/symptoms 
of conflict. 
4.  CSO Impact: Analyse the impact specific activities and whether these 
activities lead to a) peacebuilding, b) holding or c) fuelling impacts on the 
conflict and why. In analysing impact (and effectiveness) consider 
interviewing other civil society or official observers of a particular CSO 
activity in order to cross-check analyses of impact and effectiveness.   
5.  CSO Effectiveness: Examine the factors that shape the effectiveness of these 
CSO activities and the role that a) relations with the state, b) intra- civil 
society dynamics, c) the rootedness and efficiency of the CSO and d) 
time/context specific factors play in shaping the effectiveness of these 
activities in the conflict.  
6.  EU Impact: Analyse (documents, secondary literature and interviews) EU 
involvement in the conflict and its interaction with the selected CSOs 
particularly through the ENP, as well as other EU policy frameworks already 
in place (e.g., the Partnership and Association or the Association Agreements). 
In particular focus on EU activities that help alter the structure within which 
CSOs in conflict operate as well as their ability to act as agents within the 
conflict environment in order to test hypotheses 1,2 and 3. 
7.  Explaining EU Activities in the Civil Society Domain: Map the results from 
section 6 with the analysis provided in section 1 in order to understand and  
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delve into the processes that drive EU actions in conflict contexts through civil 
society. 
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